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Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol allows industrialised countries and countries in transition (Annex B countries) to reach part of their greenhouse gas emission targets abroad through the so- 
Transaction costs
Theoretically, the mechanisms can lead to a minimum cost solution of reaching a quantitative emissions target by eliminating differences in marginal abatement costs. In practice, however, due to transaction costs cost differentials will persist and the degree of utilisation of the mechanisms will be reduced. As early as 1937 Coase defined transaction costs to be the costs that arise from initiating and completing transactions, like finding partners, holding negotiations, consulting with lawyers or other experts, monitoring agreements, etc., or opportunity costs, like lost time or resources. Thus, simply being the costs that arise from the transfer of any property right, they occur to some degree in all market economies. The most obvious impact of transaction costs is that they raise the costs for the participants of the transaction and thereby lower the trading volume or even discourage some transactions from occurring.
In the context of the Kyoto Mechanisms, transaction costs are caused by the administrative process and thus depend on the institutional framework. The differing characteristics of the mechanisms will have different impacts on the components of transaction costs. Taking uncertainty into account might change the optimal choice between domestic and foreign actions. Since reduction measures abroad might bear higher risks this might shift the relative advantage to domestic actions. Figure 1 shows this. Most Annex B countries have a net demand for emission reduction that is aggregated in the demand curve while some Annex B countries have a net supply of AAUs and ERUs. This supply curve does not start at zero quantity due to availability of "hot air". The CER supply curve starts at zero as we assume that additionality tests exclude projects with negative costs. Addition of the curves leads to the world supply curve. Transaction costs now shift the curves upward and lead to a reduction of equilibrium quantity and rise of price from A to B. An important issue now is how transaction costs differ among the mechanisms because this influences their share. If CDM transaction costs are higher than JI transaction costs, the CDM share will fall. We discuss transaction cost components and try to estimate the magnitude of each component using case studies.
Who bears transaction costs?
Transaction costs can accrue to different participants in the mechanisms: to governments (including international institutions) and private actors. Generally, the private transaction costs of the non-project mechanisms are likely to be low, whereas they will be high in the case of the project-based mechanisms. Bubbles have high exante negotiation costs before countries fix the allocation of targets within the bubble.
The same applies to government-to-government trades under IET (Woerdman 2001).
Private companies have low costs to lobby ex ante for an advantageous allocation. In the case of IET, governmental transaction costs are quite low as they only have to develop general rules for the functioning of the market and to set up a registry.
However, if governments fear that companies could oversell permits and thus jeopardise compliance, they could introduce a cumbersome approval structure for international trades which could increase transaction costs of both governments and private participants. The JI-and CDM-related governmental costs will be higher than for IET due to the repeated process of approval and the need of institutions that define criteria for CDM projects (see Table 1 ). National registries which are necessary to use any of the mechanisms can be financed either through fees or by the governments. The costs of the operation of the CDM Executive Board (EB) are to be borne by project proponents in form of a fee. It is still unclear on which base this fee will be levied (for each registration or issuance of CERs?) and whether it will be proportional or a lump sum. As the first year budget draft (UNFCCC 2002b) of the EB amounts to 6 million € and it estimates that 200 project proposals are to be dealt with, a simple averaging would give a cost of 30,000 € per project. Obviously, a high share of the costs is due to the initial rule-setting, such as the 60% for panel activities. Still, EB meetings and UNFCCC staff cost as well as website administration amount to 2.3 million €, leaving 11,500 € per project.
When do transaction costs accrue?
Transaction costs accrue at different stages in the process of a transaction or project cycle (see Table 2 ) 
Registration costs
Costs to hold an account in national registry Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2000), Dudek et. al. (1996) , own additions
What factors can reduce transaction costs?
Especially in the first stage of the use of the Kyoto Mechanisms transaction costs may be an essential element in determining the degree of use of the mechanisms and their shares. Their level depends on the rules of the mechanism, the degree of utilisation of the respective mechanism and on the degree of standardisation of procedures. The more transactions are being done, the more specialised intermediaries will develop who will compete against each other. Thus, transaction costs decline with the accumulated amount of permit trades. This could raise first mover advantages for those countries that have gained some experience in unilaterally implemented permit trade before an international scheme is introduced.
Links between risks and transaction costs
Often, transaction costs are closely linked to the degree of risk an emission reduction entails. Risks also occur on different stages of the transaction: political, technical, environmental and economic risks. A part of these risks, but not all can be insured.
Portfolio diversification reduces risks, but enhances "ordinary" transaction costs. For a thorough analysis of these issues see Janssen (2001). We will not elaborate them further.
Sensitivity of transaction costs to institutional settings
Heller (1999) argues that transaction costs strongly depend on the institutional framework. This applies to the situation in host countries which may differ considerably and influences the negotiation of all mechanisms and the approval costs of the projectbased ones. It is obvious that transaction costs will be higher in countries with an inefficient regulatory framework and lead to a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other
countries.
An elaborate project cycle may enhance up-front transaction costs but lower them ex post. Moreover, rules that enhance transparency will be critical to reduce search costs even if they entail ex-ante costs. Dudek and Wiener (1996) argue for a voluntary bulletin board; the UNFCCC CDM Executive Board will develop a website where project ideas can be posted. Funds such as the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) can reduce transaction costs by developing generic procedures such as standardised contracts. They can also specialise on specific project types.
Level of transaction costs of project-based mechanisms in realworld transactions
There is not much experience with project-based environmental policy mechanisms.
Many economists (e.g. Bohm 1999) argue that they will not be attractive due to high transaction costs without quoting empirical evidence. Palmisano (1996) and Woerdman based mechanisms "Offsets" and "Netting" they were 10-15,000 $ per transaction.
Transaction costs in the AIJ pilot phase
The UNFCCC launched a pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) in 1995 -prior to the proposed implementation of the Kyoto Protocol -in order to learn more about the possible operation of JI and CDM projects under the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms. It was also hoped that this exercise will build confidence in the approach and allow a framework for international implementation of JI and CDM to be developed. Of the AIJ projects started, approximately 70 have reported transaction costs. However, definitions of transaction costs vary considerably so that these numbers have to be used with caution and we thus do not list them here. The Swedish AIJ programme in the Baltic states is the only AIJ programme with a consistent reporting of transaction costs in four categories (technical assistance, follow up, reporting and administration) and over time (see Appendix). It includes 51 projects that have been strongly standardised.
The category of follow-up costs has been allocated to the projects by dividing total follow up cost of the whole programme by the number of projects active in each year.
Reporting costs have also been dealt with in this way. This obviously advantages the projects that started early as reporting costs are likely proportional to the duration of the project. In the following analyses, follow-up and reporting costs will not be discussed.
The categories technical assistance and administration have not been averaged. They accrue in one-off sums in the start year of the project. Due to the effect that project costs accrue annually until the end of the loan 1 , the share of transaction costs has to be normalised for the full lifetime. The Swedish data can then be analysed for the whole lifetime of the loans concerning -impacts of project categories. One would expect that transaction costs of renewable energy projects are lower than those of energy efficiency projects due to the more situation-specific need of planning and the higher number of participants in the latter case -impacts of start date within the same project categories. Learning effects should reduce transaction costs of projects that started later -economies of scale within the same project categories -host country specifics within the same project categories However, one should be cautious about applying these cost estimates to full-scale CDM and JI projects as in the Swedish programme no costs for external validation and certification have accrued.
Concerning project categories 2 , we find an average technical assistance and administration cost of 20.5% of total project cost for energy efficiency projects, while it is only 14.4% for renewable energy projects. Concerning the start dates, we get a declining tendency over time, as expected (see Table 3 ): If we however look at the size of projects, we see that the apparent difference is just due to the higher average size of the renewable energy projects. Economies of scale are very important and the differences between project types of the same size are negligible (Table 4) . 
Prototype Carbon Fund
The PCF, operated by the World Bank, provides funding to host partners who wish to develop projects consistent with the JI/CDM mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. It presently has about 50 projects operating or in development. Some estimates of the transaction costs of these projects have been made and these are presented in Table 5 - Table 7 below. Data has been supplied by staff at the PCF and is not published as yet.
Moreover, the data in Table 6 and Table 7 is based on country and project-specific data that is not yet in public circulation. We have been requested to make this data more generic and so have not specified the project host country, but instead specified the world region in which the country is located. Table 5 presents the ranges, together with a "typical" or average, for the transaction costs associated with the pre-implementation phase of the project cycle for the PCF projects. Table 6 shows, for individual projects hosted by Annex B countries, the transaction costs incurred to date. Table 7 gives the same information for non-Annex B countries
where CDM projects would be located. The information on CO 2 reductions resulting from these projects is not currently available in all cases. As a consequence, only five projects have their transaction costs expressed per ton of carbon abated. In these five cases, we have assumed, unless there is evidence otherwise, that annual implementation costs (e.g. monitoring) are 80% of year 1 costs in subsequent years of the project lifetime. This assumption -based on the fact that there is a learning curve that makes the latter years' implementation less resource-intensive -is taken from
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2000). The validity of the assumption is discussed below but we believe that for the purposes of making a first approximation of possible transaction costs this is a reasonable conservative estimate. Furthermore, we assume that certification costs are mainly fixed as reported by certifiers. SGS (2002) 
Data from consultants and certifiers
There are several estimates of the different types of transaction costs by consultants and certifiers active in the emerging business of developing the Kyoto Mechanisms.
PWC carried out research with the objective to "present an independent private sector view of the implications of some of the key options for the design of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)." (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2000) The transaction costs given by them are ordered along three categories:
Types of transaction costs:
Costs are divided into a pre-implementation and implementation phase.
Number of operational entities (OE's) involved in the project:
In order to avoid conflicts of interest validation, verification and certification may be undertaken by separate institutions. Therefore different levels were distinguished according to the number of OE's used over the project cycle. We look only at those that are possible under the Marrakesh Accords:
(i) One OE is responsible for the whole project cycle (validation, verification and certification 1 ). The same OE can do both validation and verification if it gets a special permit by the CDM Executive Board.
(ii) One OE is responsible for the validation in the pre-implementation phase, one other OE provides verification and certification services in the implementation phase 2 3. Project type, project size and host country PWC has estimated the additional costs incurred by project developers in gaining CDM credits. The costs are short run forecasts and are expected to decrease in the long run, due to experience. The transaction costs for five generic project types, a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plant, Retrofit CCGT project, Wind project and two Photovoltaic projects with 1 MW and 100 kW capacity, are presented in Table 8 -12; 1 Then it was assumed that certification would be done by OEs, not the Executive Board. 2 The third level is not relevant any more under the Marrakesh Accords; it assumed three different OEs. they are derived from the number of person-days necessary for each step. Assumptions about rates per person-day are:
• project developers : range 750 -1200 €; central value 1000 €;
• project consultants -local engineers/NGOs in host country: 200 €;
• international management consultancy in host country: 300 €;
• international management consultancy in OECD states: 1500 €.
These assumptions result in a range of estimates for each project. The figures given are mid-range estimates. PWC gives total costs over the project cycle and total days for phase 1 (preimplementation) and phase 2 (implementation). The lifetime of each project is 15 years.
As the division into the separate day rate categories is not given by PWC we calculate the costs for Phases 1 and 2 simply by using the percentages of the split of days.
The emissions reduction figure is obtained by multiplication of energy (per lifetime) for the new plant (capacity x load factor x 131,400 h) with the difference between old and new emissions. Table 13 provides the data for these calculations. It can easily be seen that costs rise with the number of OE's involved and, more significantly, that the costs per t CO 2 reduction are negligible for big, but significant for smaller projects. For the renewable energy projects, i.e. wind and PV, less effort is required in absolute terms than for the large-scale fossil projects. This is due to the fact that the projects with zero emissions require minimal verification effort in the implementation phase.
The estimates do not take socio-economic or political conditions in different host countries into account. Moreover, the data is averaged over a number of CDM-projects in different countries and is thus not country specific.
A report by EcoSecurities (2000) examines transaction costs that arise for JI electricity generation projects. The data gives ranges of transaction costs based on several projects.
Examples for a typical small and large project within these ranges are:
• a 150 MW gas plant, 20 year lifetime, resulting in reductions of 350,000 t CO 2 /year;
• a 2 MW biomass plant, 20 year lifetime, resulting in reductions of 35,000 t CO 2 /year. Total Pre-Implementation Phase 57,000 -90,000
Implementation phase
Monitoring (annual) 3000 -15,000
Certification 5-10% of ERU value
Gas plant* 87,500 -175,000
Biomass plant* 8750 -17,500
Enforcement (annual) 1-3% of ERU value Gas plant* 17,500 -51,500
Biomass plant* 1750 -5150
Total Implementation Phase (20 years, undiscounted)
Gas plant* 2,160,000 -4,830,000
Biomass plant* 270,000 -753,000
Total Project Cycle
Gas plant* (costs per t CO 2 ) 2.2 -4.9 million (0.3 -0.7 €/t) Biomass plant* (costs per t CO 2 ) 0.3 -0.8 million (0.4 -1.1 €/t) Source: Ecosecurities (2000), own calculations * Reductions as quoted above, ERU value 5 €/t
The estimates are not country specific and there are no details given concerning the single projects underlying the transaction cost ranges.
The calculation shows that certification and enforcement costs dwarf all the other components. This is unlikely to be the case. First, the rates may be overestimated.
Second, EcoSecurities´ assumption that certification and enforcement costs are proportional to the amount of ERUs generated is debatable. As discussed above, it is likely that there will be a degressive price schedule of certifiers. Thus, absolute transaction costs will be similar for all projects, independent of the size of the project.
This means that costs per t CO 2 reduced will be much higher for smaller projects and may make them less attractive to investors. The two above mentioned projects are both medium or large sized projects with small costs per t CO 2 reduced.
Maly et al. (2001) estimate the JI supply of the Czech Republic using the MARKAL model and find a set of 345 attractive projects. Assuming that each project needs 10
person-days for pre-approval assessment and 3 person-days per year for issuance of credits, a JI office of 12 permanent staff would be needed and overall host country government transaction cost is estimated at 215,000 €. Brockmann et al. (1999, p. 90 ) quote transaction costs of SO 2 trading in the U.S. of 1%.
Transaction costs of emissions trading
In the beginning, they were about 5% (Klaassen/Nentjes 1997) but when an active spot market with several specialised brokers developed, they quickly came down. Kerr and Maré (1997) found broadly defined transaction costs of about 10% in the case of the lead phasedown programme, the first large scale emissions trading programme, albeit with a relatively small number of participants. A lower boundary for transaction costs in a highly liquid market of a well defined financial commodity may be 0.2% -these are the rates quoted by direct brokerage firms in securities and bonds ( see e.g. ComdirectBank, www.comdirect.de). Using a price of 4 €/t CO2, the transaction cost would thus start at 0.2 €/t and finally settle at around 1 cent.
It is difficult to get estimates about brokerage fees in the grey market for greenhouse gas emission rights as brokers are reluctant to disclose the fees. A fee of 7% for a transaction of several thousand t CO 2 has been mentioned.
Conclusions
Only recently, transaction costs became an issue in the discussion on the Kyoto mechanisms leading to the Marrakesh Accords clause that small scale CDM projects should get special treatment. Transaction costs will be substantial and will lead to a lower than expected utilisation ratio of the mechanisms. While the CDM and Second
Track JI have to bear all categories of transaction costs, IET and bubbles are less impacted (see Table 16 ). components. The surveys analysed by us underline this. Table 17 tries to summarise the correlation between project size and transaction costs. It is mainly based on the PWC study, the PCF and the Swedish experiences. However, the other results fit more or less well in this picture. They were used to determine the upper and lower bounds of the five categories. But it should be stressed that this is only a rough picture and further research is necessary in order to come up with better data. The savings potentials of these measures are summarised in Table 18 . Some of them impact on the environmental credibility of the CDM. GWh and other projects emitting less than 15 kilotonnes of CO 2 annually, will benefit from simplified modalities and procedures. The annual CER volume of such projects will have the following maximum thresholds, if one assumes baseline emissions of 900 g/kWh. It can be seen that the threshold is relatively high for hydropower, critical for wind power but already too low for energy efficiency projects. For the other project types, the exact definition of "direct emission" is key. Under current sizes of cement plants, blending projects are unlikely to remain under the threshold. A fuel switch project with efficiency improvement could achieve a value between the efficiency and the wind project.
In light of the reported transaction costs estimates, the Marrakesh decision on simplified rules for small-scale projects and the agreed threshold seems reasonable. Looking at Table 18 , it might be a good idea to introduce a third track for mini and micro projects (e.g. PV) in order to make them viable. These projects bear a very high transaction cost burden. Usually, they will not cause any indirect effects. Therefore, very simple modalities and procedures should be applied. If one wants to safeguard the environmental integrity a way to make small scale projects viable would obviously be to subsidise their transaction costs if the projects can prove that they have positive externalities.
References:
Bohm (1999): International greenhouse gas emission trading, TEMA Nord 1999:506, Stockholm Brockmann, Karl; Stronzik, Marcus; Bergmann, Heidi (1999) 
